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This paper studies the eﬃciency of a stock market equilibrium. We extend a
standard general equilibrium framework with moral hazard (Magill and Quinzii 1999,
2002) to allow for a more general initial ownership distribution of ﬁrms. We show that
the market allocation is constrained-eﬃc i e n to n l yw h e ni ne a c hﬁrm the entrepreneur
who generates payoﬀs through unobservable eﬀort has the full initial property rights
to his ﬁrm.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Can stock markets perform their role of allocating resources eﬃciently in the presence of
moral hazard? Obviously, when production depends on entrepreneurial eﬀort (which is
neither veriﬁable nor contractible), one cannot expect the ﬁrst best to be achieved. This is
because risk-sharing and ﬁnancing motives require that an entrepreneur sells parts of his
ﬁrm but in doing this he reduces his incentives to exert eﬀort in the ﬁrm, thus creating an
ineﬃciency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A more appropriate question is therefore to ask
whether a stock market operates eﬃciently relative to the moral hazard problem (this is
the concept of constrained-eﬃciency dating back to Diamond, 1967), i.e., whether a social
planner who cannot create new assets and who cannot observe individual eﬀorts is unable
to improve the market allocation.
Several authors have addressed this issue (e.g. Kihlstrom and Mathews, 1990, Kocher-
lakota, 1998, Lisboa, 2001, Magill and Quinzii, 1999, 2002), showing that a stock market
can be indeed (constrained)-eﬃcient. The intuition of this result is that investors are aware
of the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem and lower their valuation of the ﬁrm in an-
ticipation of a lower eﬀort choice when an entrepreneur sells a stake in his ﬁrm. Thus,
the ineﬃciencies stemming from a lower eﬀort choice are internalized by the entrepreneur
through the lower price he obtains from selling the ﬁrm.
In particular, Magill and Quinzii (1999, 2002) prove the (constrained)-eﬃciency of the
stock market in a standard general equilibrium framework with moral hazard under the
assumption that investors correctly infer an entrepreneur’s eﬀort from his (observable)
ﬁnancing decisions and that an entrepreneur cannot inﬂuence equilibrium state prices (i.e.,
price perceptions are rational and competitive).
In their analysis, entrepreneurs are all full owners of their ﬁrm before trading. In
this paper we show that full initial ownership is in fact a necessary condition to obtain
constrained eﬃciency. Intuitively, the reason for this result is a simple externality: an
2entrepreneur does not internalize the ineﬃciencies imposed on other initial owners when
selling his ﬁrm.
The condition of full initial ownership before trade may not be fulﬁlled in practice for
several reasons. First, venture capitalists typically own a stake in the venture at the time
this goes public. Furthermore, stock markets oﬀer several opportunities for an entrepreneur
to sell shares of his ﬁrm: besides at the IPO, an entrepreneur can sell through secondary
m a r k e tt r a d i n go rw i t hs e a s o n e do ﬀerings. Hence, even though he may be the full owner
of the ﬁr ma tt h et i m eo fg o i n gp u b l i c ,h em a yn o tb es oa te a c ht i m eh et r a d e s .M o r e o v e r ,
there may be several owners with a stake in the ﬁrm to begin with (e.g., several entrepre-
neurs or managers) that trade their stakes in the ﬁrm independently. Thus, under quite
plausible circumstances, our results imply that a stockmarket will not operate eﬃciently.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we deﬁne a stock
market equilibrium in a general equilibrium model under moral hazard by extending the
framework of Magill and Quinzii (1999) and (2002, Example 1) (for brevity, MQ from now
on) for a generalized initial ownership in ﬁrms. Subsequently, we show that the market
equilibrium is (constrained)-ineﬃcient whenever there is not full initial inside ownership.
2 Stock Market Equilibrium with Moral Hazard
A one-good production economy runs for two periods.1 There are two types of agents in the
economy: entrepreneurs and investors. The set of entrepreneurs and investors is denoted
by I1 and I2, respectively. Both sets are assumed to be non-empty and ﬁnite. I = I1 ∪ I2
is the set of all agents. Each agent i ∈ I has an initial wealth ωi
0 > 0 at t =0 .I fa g e n ti
is an entrepreneur, then he can obtain an (uncertain) income stream at t =1by investing
1The exposition in this section is condensed. For a more detailled discussion of the framework and the
issues involved we refer to MQ.

































where xi =( xi
0,x i
s,...,xi
S) is the vector of consumption at t =0and in all states at t =1 .
For an investor i ∈ I2,w es e tei = zi =0since F i
s =0 .
The economy satisﬁes the following additional assumptions: ui
0 and ui
1 are diﬀerentiable,
strictly concave and increasing; ci is diﬀerentiable, convex and increasing, with ci(0) = 0.
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i.e., consumption is essential in all states and eﬀort is essentially costless for small levels
of eﬀort. fi(zi,e i) is assumed to be diﬀerentiable and increasing in (zi,e i) and concave in
zi,w i t hfi(0,e i)=fi(zi,0) = 0 (both inputs are essential).
Entrepreneurs can sell claims to their ﬁrms on a stock market (but their eﬀort is still
required for production). There is further a single bond traded, which is riskless because
we assume that the penalty for bankruptcy is inﬁnite. We deviate from MQ by allowing for
a more general initial ownership structure that does not require that an entrepreneur has
full ownership in his ﬁrm. More formally, we denote an entrepreneur’s i initial ownership













0,i =1for all i ∈ I.
The agents’ choices and their timing are as follows. At t =0 , an agent i decides on the
amount of capital to invest in his ﬁrm zi, the amount to borrow bi,t h es h a r eo fh i so w n








0,k).I t i s a s s u m e d
that ﬁrms’ income streams ηi ∈ RS
+ are linearly independent to ensure that entrepreneurs
cannot replicate the income stream of their ﬁrm by trading other ﬁrms.2 Denote with q0
the price of the bond and with Qi the price of ﬁrm i (the price for full ownership of ﬁrm







































s,s =1 ,...,S (2)
After the ﬁnancial decisions have been made, the agent chooses his optimal eﬀort if he is
an entrepreneur. Since eﬀort is unobservable, the eﬀort choice has only an impact on the













Under some regularity conditions the optimal eﬀort choice is unique and diﬀerentiable, and
exercising eﬀort is always worthwhile (see assumption MCMP and Proposition 1 in Magill
and Quinzii, 1999). Because of the uniqueness result we refer to the solution to (E) by
e e = e e(bi,zi,θ
i).
All ﬁnancial decisions are assumed to be mutually observable and agents’ preferences are
common knowledge. Hence, although eﬀort is not observable, investors can infer from entre-
preneur’s i ﬁnancing decisions (bi,z i,θ
i) the (unique) eﬀo r tt h a th ew i l le x e r c i s ee ei(bi,zi,θ
i).
Furthermore, we denote with qi the price of ﬁrm i’s unit income stream ηi. Competitive-
ness of agents implies that they take qi as given.3 Thus, for a given ﬁnancial portfolio
2In MQ, this is ensured by ruling out short sales. This is not suﬃcient here since entrepreneurs can
have positive endowments in other ﬁrms.
3Competitive behavior is consistent with our model assumptions: because of the multiplicative structure
of the production technology (Fi = fi(zi,e i)ηi), the unit income stream generated by ﬁrm i cannot be
changed by varying the production plan (zi,e i).
5(bi,zi,θ







which is in turn the price an entrepreneur i expects to receive if he chooses (bi,zi,θ
i) (price
perceptions are both competitive and rational). This leads to the following deﬁnition of a
stock market equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 A stock market equilibrium in an economy with generalized ownership θ0
consists of actions (x,e,z,b,θ) and prices q0 and qi (i ∈ I1) such that
(i) for each agent, (xi,ei) maximizes Ui(xi,e i) subject to (1), (2), with Qi in (1) given











3I n e ﬃciency of the Stock Market Equilibrium
An allocation is constrained Pareto optimal (CPO) if a social planner that has to respect
the limited availability of assets (bonds and stocks) and the unobservability of eﬀort cannot
improve the allocation. Or, in other words, there are no prices and feasible reallocation of
ﬁnancial assets that lead to a pareto-improvement in the economy. MQ have shown that
in an economy where entrepreneurs have full ownership in their ﬁrms before trading at the
stockmarket, rational and competitive price perceptions induce the entrepreneur to choose
an optimal capital structure, and thus guarantee the CPO of the market equilibrium. The
following proposition shows that CPO breaks down exactly when there is at least one
entrepreneur that has not full initial ownership in his ﬁrm (alternatively, we can interpret
Proposition 1 as saying that the market equilibrium is CPO only if entrepreneurs are
allowed to trade once at the stock market, namely at the ﬁrst stage of the economy when
they have full ownership).
6Proposition 2 The stock market equilibrium is (constrained)-eﬃcient if and only if there
is full initial inside ownership (θ
i
0,i =1for all i ∈ I1).
Proof. ”if ” part: θ
i
0,i =1for all i ∈ I1. This is exactly the case of MQ. For the proof
we refer to them.
”only if ”:L e t (x,e,z,b,θ) with q0 and qi (i ∈ I1) be an arbitrary stock market
equilibrium. We show that there exists a feasible reallocation of assets that is pareto-
improving if there exists at least one entrepreneur i ∈ I1 with θ
i
0,i < 1. T h i sp r o v e st h e
necessity of full initial inside ownership for CPO.
Let θ
i
0,i < 1 for one i ∈ I1. Consider the following redistribution of shares of ﬁrm i:
entrepreneur i0s stake in his own ﬁr mi si n c r e a s e db ya n( i n ﬁnitesimal) small amount dθ
i
i,





























i.A l lo t h e rﬁnancial
decisions (z,b,θ6=i) and prices q0 and qi, i ∈ I1, are not changed. For brevity, we suppress










i =0 , the reallocation is feasible. Furthermore, the
reallocation does not change the eﬀo r tc h o i c eo fa ne n t r e p r e n e u rj 6= i. We show this by
demonstrating that if all eﬀort choices ek, k 6= i,j do not change, the f.o.c.’s for eﬀort ej is
still fulﬁlled. From the uniqueness of the eﬀort choice follows then that dej =0for j 6= i.



















Thus, if the reallocation does not aﬀect income xj
s at t =1for all s =1 ,...S ,( 5 )i ss t i l l
fulﬁlled. From (2) and (4) we have under the assumption that all eﬀort choices ek, k 6= i,




















































i.e., the impact of higher eﬀort by i on j0s income at t =1(ﬁrst term) is exactly oﬀset by
ar e d u c t i o ni nj0s stake in ﬁrm i (second term). Hence, for all j 6= i, the f.o.c. for eﬀort is
fulﬁlled and thus dej =0for all j 6= i.
Next we show that the reallocation is pareto-improving. We know that the f.o.c. for
the choice of the optimal amount of shares in ﬁrm i for entrepreneur i a n da ni n v e s t o rm





















































Now we can compute the utility change for an entrepreneur j 6= i.S i n c e dxj
s =0and






































where the last line is obtained by using (4) to substitute dθ
j



































































i ≥ 0 (10)

























































i ≥ 0 (11)




























































because of (7). Hence, no agent is worse oﬀ and because of θ
i
0,i < 1 there exists at least
one agent m 6= i with θ
m
0,i > 0, who is strictly better oﬀ by (9), (10) or (11). 4
The intuition for the existence of a Pareto-improving reallocation if there is initial
outside ownership is straightforward. Since the entrepreneur does not internalize the inef-
ﬁciency losses on initial outside owners when selling his ﬁr m ,a ni n c r e a s ei nh i ss t a k ei nt h e
ﬁrm reduces this externality and makes all initial outside owners better oﬀ while having
only a second order impact on all other agents.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we show that the contrained-eﬃciency of decentralized stock markets breaks
down when entrepreneurs do not have full ownership in their ﬁrms before market trading.
Hence, a stock market generally does not fulﬁll its function of allocating resources opti-
mally across agents. The question arises of how eﬃciency can be ensured. Government
intervention, through appropriate taxes, may help to restore eﬃciency (see, for example,
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 2003). Alternatively, retaining the decentralization of the
economy, other organizational forms, like the competitive pools of Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002) can possibly overcome the externalities posed by entrepreneurs on initial owners.
One speciﬁc way to eliminate the externality shown in this paper would be to use contracts
that limit the possibilities for entrepreneurs to divest their stake in the ﬁrm through the
stock market without the previous agreement of the initial owners (as analyzed in Wagner,
2002).
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